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I 
In Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book XII, Chapters 6 
and 7, the Unmoved Mover is said to be an eternal, en-
tirely actual substance which moves other things 
without itself being moved in any way by any other 
thing. I attempt to analyse and clarify these views 
about the Unmoved Mover and will focus my analysis 
around the following two questions: 
I. What does the Unmoved Mover cause? 
II. In what way does the Unmoved Mover cause what it causes? 
II 
What the Unmoved Mover moves is importantly tied to 
what the Unmoved Mover is. Aristotle prepares the 
ground for the introduction of the concept of an 
Unmoved Mover in Chapters 1-6 of Book XII. In those 
chapters he summarizes much of the work he has done in 
the Metaphysics up to that point: for example, he 
discusses the different senses of substance (1069a30-
40, 1070a9-15), the principles and causes of change and 
motion (1070al3-1070b35), and the potentiality/actual-
ity distinction (1071a5-17). 
He reminds us that there are two types of sensible 
substance: the type which is capable of change and is 
perishable; the other type is not capable of change, 
but is capable of motion and is imperishable. The 
first type is exemplified in an individual human being 
or an individual oak tree; the second type by the 
celestial bodies. Aristotle goes on to argue that 
there must be yet a third type of substance—an 
eternal, imperishable and immutable substance. (See 
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his detailed discussion of these topics in Met. VI, 1.) 
His arguments for the existence of this third type of 
substance contribute to our question, since it appears 
that the concept of the Unmoved Mover is derived from 
his understanding of motion. In brief, he argues that 
if we construe motion in a certain way, then there must 
exist an unmoved mover. His argument begins in Met. 
XII, 6 1071b3, and I formulate it, with commentary, 
below: 
(1) Substances are the first of existing things. 
(Substance is being in the primary sense; 
first or primary in definition, in time, 
and in knowledge iMet. VII 1028a31-35].) 
(2) If substances are the first of existing 
things, and if all substances are 
destructible, then all things are 
destructible. 
(If substances are destructible or 
perishable, then all being is 
destructible. Or, if all substances are 
capable of coming into being or passing 
out of being, i.e., are contingent, then 
everything that exists is thereby 
contingent.[1]) 
(3) It is impossible that movement (motion) 
should either come into being or cease to 
be, in the same sense that time itself 
could never come into being or cease to 
be. Movement is continuous in the same 
sense in which time is continuous, because 
time is either the same thing as movement 
or an attribute of movement (Physics IV,11 
and VIII, 6). 
(4) If this is so, and motion must have always 
existed, then motion must have had a cause 
(source, origin). 
(Motion is not a substance; it exists as 
an attribute of a substance. Hence, there 
must exist a substance which is 
'responsible' in some sense for the motion 
which has always existed.) 
(5) If there is a substance capable of produc-
ing motion in other things but is not ac-
tually doing so, then it does not follow 
that there will necessarily be movement. 
(Here the potentiality/actuality distinc-
tion becomes important. Just because a 
substance has a potentiality to produce 
motion, it is not necessary that it actu-
alize that potentiality. We cannot 
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guarantee the existence of motion unless 
we understand this substance to be actu-
alizing its potentiality for producing 
motion.) 
(6) However, even this substance actualizing 
its potentiality may not be sufficient—if 
•its essence is potency'. 
(If the essence of this substance somehow 
consisted of only a potentiality for pro-
ducing motion, then that it produced 
motion actually might be merely accidental 
or else not a production of motion per 
se.) 
(7) Since 'that which exists potentially may 
possibly not be', it follows that motion 
may not be eternal. 
(Unexercised potentiality may never be 
actualized. Hence, a substance with unac-
tualized potentiality could never be suf-
ficient for eternal motion.) 
(8) Therefore, whatever substance is to be 
sufficient for eternal motion must be a 
substance whose 'essence is actuality'. 
(Ross translated 'substance' here as 
•principle', consistant with Aristotle's 
understanding of substance as a principle, 
source, origin—arche.) 
(9) Further, 'such a substance must be without 
matter'. 
(It should be mentioned here that 
Aristotle does not specify which sense of 
matter he means here. At 1069b25-27, he 
distinguishes 'matter for generation' 
which we understand is the matter pos-
sessed by sensible substances capable of 
generation and destruction. There is also 
matter for 'motion from one place to 
another'. The heavenly bodies possess 
this type of matter only. They are sensi-
ble substances, but due to the type of 
matter they possess, are incapable of des-
truction and hence, are eternal. The gen-
eral principle here is that any substance 
which is capable of motion must have 
matter, in one of the two senses. Since 
the substance we are seeking must be 
eternal, it certainly could not have mat-
ter for generation. Further, if it pos-
sessed matter for motion, while remaining 
eternal, it would itself still be capable 
of being moved, just as the planets are 
capable of being moved. 
159 
(However, the original hypothesis at 
1071b5 is that there must be an eternal 
unmovable substance. Since motion is 
eternal, the substance we are seeking (a) 
must be eternal, (b) its essence must be 
complete actuality, and (c) it itself must 
have no potentiality for being moved. 
Aristotle does not spell out his argument 
for (c). I suggest that (c) can be 
justified, first by the argument about the 
two senses of matter given above; second, 
by arguing that (c) is a consequence of 
(b). A substance whose essence is actual-
ity, by definition, is one which possesses 
no unactualized potentiality. A substance 
which possesses no unactualized potential-
ity is incapable of being changed or 
moved. Therefore, if our substance is in-
deed completely acualized, then it is en-
tirely incapable of change or motion of 
any kind.) 
(10) The conclusion to the argument can now be 
drawn: There must exist a substance which 
is eternal and unmovable. 
In sum, given Aristotle's conception of motion as 
described, then in order to make this concept intellig-
ible and (perhaps) to give it an ontological 'foot-
hold', he argues (as formulated above) that there must 
exist a substance sufficient for the intelligibility of 
the concept of motion as well as causally sufficient to 
explain the actual existence of motion. 
In Chapter 7, 1072a23-25, Aristotle gives a 
slightly different argument for the same conclusion: 
(1) "There is, then, something which is always 
moved with an unceasing motion, which is 
motion in a circle; this is plain not in 
theory only but in fact."12] 
(The 'something' referred to is the first 
heaven, the outermost sphere in the 
universe, "in which the fixed stars are 
set".) 
(2) "Therefore, the first heaven must be 
eternal" (1072a23-24). 
(This follows because only an eternal sub-
stance would be capable of engaging in 
eternal motion.) 
(3) And since that which both is moved and 
moves is intermediate (i.e., the first 
heaven is intermediate in this sense), it 
follows that there is something which 
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moves the first heaven but is itself unmoved. 
(4) Therefore, "There is something which moves 
without being moved' having been shown by 
previous argument to be 'eternal, sub-
stance and actuality" (1072a24-25). 
It is this argument which reveals the first hint as 
to what in particular the Unmoved Mover causes—the 
eternal circular motion of the first heaven. Since 
eternal circular motion is the 'highest' sort of 
motion, this highest sort of motion cannot be accounted 
for by any other than that which possesses the 
requisite properties of substance, i.e., eternality and 
actuality. In Met. XII, 7 Aristotle does not explic-
itly name any other specific case of motion for which 
the Unmoved Mover is responsible. The discussion of 
the multiple unmoved movers in XII, 8 is not directly 
of concern here.[3] 
If we accept that eternal circular locomotion 
(i.e., motion in space from one place to another), then 
it becomes clear why this sort of motion requires for 
its intelligibility the Unmoved Mover as described. It 
seems quite reasonable, however, to wonder whether 
there might not be more to the story. What about all 
the rest of the motion whose existence 'is plain not in 
theory only but in fact'? In hopes of not begging any 
questions, I phrase my concern roughly in this way: 
does the Unmoved Mover have anything to do with the 
motions (of any sort) observed in either terrestrial 
nature or in human activity? 
In my view, the answer is yes. The Unmoved Mover 
serves as sufficient arche for motion in nature as well 
as human activity. There are difficulties with such a 
view, and.I cannot hope to defend it adequately here. 
But I do try to sketch out the plausibility of this 
view in Section II below. The chief support for the 
view, I believe, rests soldily in the Met. XII, 7 text 
and in the overall teleological character of 
Aristotle's metaphysics. 
The concept of a substantial, eternal, actual 
Unmoved Mover is developed as a principle or cause of 
the necessarily eternal character of motion. This 
principle is shown to be sufficient for the existence 
of eternal circular motion. What has not yet been 
shown is how the Unmoved Mover achieves the production 
of motion. Further, I have deliberately left unspeci-
fied the sense of cause in which the Unmoved Mover is 
said to cause, or to be the cause of, motion. It is to 
these interesting questions that I now turn. 
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III 
In what way does the Unmoved cause what it causes? 
The Unmoved Mover which is substance, eternal, com-
pletely actual "moves in the following manner. The ob-
ject of desire and the object of thought move without 
being moved" (1072a26, Loeb edition). 
The Unmoved Mover, then, succeeds in producing 
motion in the world insofar as it is an object of 
desire or an object of thought. In order to understand 
the type of causation implicit here, it will be useful 
to examine the notion of an 'object of desire'. 
In Book III, 10 of De Anima, Aristotle discusses 
the 'sources of movement' of the animal. He argues 
that the calculative intellect ("which calculates means 
to an end") and appetite ("in every form of it relative 
to an end") are both "capable of originating local 
movements" (433al5-16). The reason why these two are 
the sources of movement is that "the object of appetite 
starts a movement and as a result of that thought 
[i.e., calculation] gives rise to movement, the object 
of appetite being to it a source of stimulation" 
(433al9-20). 
We see, then, that the object of appetite (of 
desire) starts a movement in the animal. The object of 
desire present to an animal stimulates the mind to cal-
culate (deliberate) about achieving the object of 
desire. The calculative intellect will not begin to 
'go to work', so to speak, unless there is present to 
it an object of desire. What emerges in the following 
sequence: what initially stimulates movement in the 
animal is the object of desire. The object of desire 
stimulates the 'faculty' of appetite in the sense that 
the animal recognizes the object present to it as an 
object of desire. Only after this initial recognition 
does the faculty of calculation exercise its function 
of deliberating about means to achieve the object of 
desire. "Mind [calculative intellect] is never found 
producing movement without appetite" (433a23). 
Now what is it about the object of desire such that 
it produces movement in the animal to which it is an 
object of desire? 
. this object [of desire] may be either the real or the apparent good. To produce movement the object must be more than this: it must be [aJ good that can be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being. (433a29-30)[4] 
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Thus, if the object of desire is to produce movement in 
the animal, it must be a good of the practical sort. 
Only a practical good could be brought into being by 
action. An absolute good could never be brought into 
being. Just as truth (as apprehended by theoretical 
intellect) is universal and necessary, 'truths' (as ap-
prehended by the practical intellect) are opinions 
(Nichomachean Ethics VII, 3) and as such are contingent 
(Posterior Analytics I, 33). 
So, an object of desire causes motion in an animal insofar as it is a practical good realizable only in the activity of the animal. While it is not correct to say, for Aristotle, that 'movement' and 'activity' are identical in meaning, it is nevertheless correct to say that in realizing a good in activity the animal moves.[5] 
In the same chapter of De Anima and also in the 
Physics V,l, Aristotle distinguishes three factors or 
ingredients in movement generally. (1) "that which 
originates the movement, (2) that by means of which it 
originates it, and (3) that which is moved" (433bl3-
15). In the Physics, the three factors are stated as 
"a mover, a moved, and a goal of motion" (224b5-6). 
In any case of movement, then, the object of desire 
is "that which moves without itself being moved" and 
"is the realizable good" (433bl5-16); it is that which 
'originates the movement' and is the 'goal of motion'. 
Second, 'that which at once moves and is moved is the 
faculty of appetite'. The faculty of appetite is 'that 
by means of which' the object of desire originates 
movement in the animal. The faculty of appetite is the 
•mover,' a moved mover; whereas the object of desire is 
an unmoved mover. Third, 'that which is moved' is the 
animal. 
In sum, an object of desire produces movement in a 
creature by means of an intermediary mover—the faculty 
of appetite. This faculty is moved by the object of 
desire, and in turn, the faculty acts upon the animal 
to try to realize this desired good in activity. 
In Met. XII, 7 Aristotle says that an object of 
desire moves without itself being moved. And if so, 
then the Unmoved Mover is a good of some kind. Having 
gone this far, Aristotle introduces a term not new to 
his philosophy but new to the present discussion. The 
term is 'final cause'. He says that 'final cause' has 
two senses: (1) "some being for whose good an action 
is done," and (2) "something at which action aims" 
(1072bl-2). He goes on to argue that only in the 
second sense can the Unmoved Mover be a final cause, 
for the reason that "of these [final causes] the latter 
exists among unchangeable entities though the former 
does not" (1072b3). Since the Unmoved Mover has been 
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proven to be an unchangeable entity, then if it is to 
be a final cause, it must therefore be a final cause in 
the second sense. 
The arguments from the De Anima discussed above, I 
think, lend support and give content to Aristotle's 
concise argument about the Unmoved Mover moving other 
things as a final cause. In my view, the argument can 
be expanded and clarified as follows: An object of 
desire moves without itself being moved (i.e.. is an 
unmoved mover) only insofar as it is a final cause in 
the second sense. The object of desire which stimu-
lates the faculty of appetite does not itself change. 
The object of desire is a stimulus to the creature— 
through the intermediary of the faculty of appetite—to 
act in such a way as to realize a good in activity. 
The object of desire is not identical to that good; nor 
is it identical to the activity which brings that good 
into being. The object of desire is that entity which 
in some sense 'represents* or 'stands for* or 'serves 
as the ideal' of the good which the animal strives to 
realize in activity. In the sense, then, we can 
properly say that an unmoved mover is a final cause of 
movement. 
This discussion generates further lines of investi-
gation. Granting that, in general, an unmoved mover is 
a final cause of motion and moves as an object of 
desire, why and in what sense is the Unmoved Mover an 
object of desire? 
First, in general, any final cause is properly un-
derstood as an object of desire, 'that for the sake of 
which' an activity is engaged in by a creature. And 
further, any final cause in the second sense described 
above is an unmoved mover, i.e., produces motion in an 
animal without itself being moved. Granting these gen-
eral points, for what in particular is the first 
Unmoved Mover—an eternal, immutable, entirely actual 
substance—an object of desire? 
We have already noted the argument by which 
Aristotle shows that the Unmoved Mover must be the 
cause of the eternal circular motion of the first 
heaven. If the Unmoved Mover is to be the final cause 
of eternal circular motion, it must be an 'object of 
desire' for the first heaven, such that the first 
heaven realizes some good in that motion. If this in-
terpretation is justified, exploration of it requires 
that we give more content to the formal notion of the 
Unmoved Mover. 
Thus far, Aristotle has argued that the Unmoved 
Mover is a substance, eternal, imperceptible (i.e., 
without matter of any kind), entirely actual, capable 
of producing motion without itself being moved. Inso-
far as it is a final cause, it is an object of desire 
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for that which it moves. An object of desire must be a good or an apparent good which can be realized in some respect in some motion or activity. 
At 1072b5-14, Aristotle gives additional arguments for (1) the necessary existence of the Unmoved Mover, as well as arguments for the sense in which (2) the Unmoved Mover is a first principle, and the sense in which (3) the Unmoved Mover is a good. I will consider each in turn. 
(1) Eternal circular locomotion must be accounted 
for in some way. Eternal circular locomotion is the 
highest kind of motion and therefore could not have 
been caused by anything which itself is in motion. If 
eternal circular motion were caused by a mover which 
was also in motion, the motion of that mover would have 
to be of a higher kind than eternal circular motion. 
But that is impossible. Therefore, eternal circular 
motion must be caused by something which itself is not 
in motion. Eternal circular motion exists. Therefore, 
the Unmoved Mover exists necessarily (1072b5-10). 
The sense of 'necessity' proper to the Unmoved 
Mover is specified in Met. V, 5: "We say that that 
which cannot be otherwise is necessarily as it is. And 
from this sense of 'necessary' all the others are some-
how derived" (1015a34-35). A thing (a being) is neces-
sary (exists necessarily) when it cannot be otherwise 
than it is. "Now some things owe their necessity to 
something other than themselves; others do not, but are 
themselves the source of necessity in other things" 
(1015b9-10). 
The first heaven owes its being actualized to the 
Unmoved Mover which is its final cause; the Unmoved 
Mover does not depend upon anything else for its 
existence, and is itself the source of its being as it 
is—eternal, entirely actualized substance. 
Aristotle says in Met. V, 5 that it follows from 
this notion of necessity that which exists necessarily 
is "the simple; for this does not admit of more states 
than one, so that it cannot even be in one state and 
also in another" (1015bll-12). This view is, of 
course, consistent with his comment in Met. XII, 7: 
"substance is first, and in substance, that which is 
simply and exists actually" (1072a32-33). To be 
'simple' means to be without parts and not to admit of 
alternate states of being—which is to say, not to ad-
mit of any motion or change of any kind.[6] If a being 
could admit of motion of any kind, then it must have 
some unactualized potentiality. But the Unmoved Mover 
has no unactualized potentiality. Therefore, in this 
sense, the Unmoved Mover is shown to be simple. Its 
simplicity, I suggest, is a consequence of its 
necessity, in this way: a being which is necessary 
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cannot be other than it is. A thing can be other than 
it is when it admits of parts; because when it admits 
of parts, it admits of potentiality. The Unmoved Mover 
is necessary; therefore, it can admit neither of parts 
nor potentiality. 
(2) In what sense is the Unmoved Mover a first 
principle? From Met. V, 1 we understand a principle to 
be a 'beginning* or a 'starting point'. The relevant 
senses of beginning or starting point, I take it, is 
the most general sense: "It is common, then, to all 
beginnings to be the first point from which a thing 
either is or comes to be or is known; but of these some 
are immanent in the thing and others outside" (1013al7-
20). A major argument of Met. VII is that substance is 
that sense of being in which its beginning or principle 
is immanent and not extrinsic. Thus, insofar as the 
Unmoved Mover is substance, it is true to say that the 
Unmoved Mover contains within itself its own starting 
point from which it exists and is known. 
Further, he says that there are as many senses of 
cause as there are senses of beginnings, "for all 
causes are beginnings" (1013al6). Combining these 
ideas, then, we can say that the Unmoved Mover is a 
principle in the sense that it contains within itself 
the starting point, source, or origin of its own being 
and being known. And insofar as it is a principle of 
its being and being known, it is a cause. Of what? I 
suggest that the Unmoved Mover is properly said to be 
the cause of itself, for no other thing is higher in 
being, goodness, or actuality. Further, the Unmoved 
Mover is the final cause of the highest sort of motion. 
Lastly, as I shall argue below, it is the final cause 
of the natural motions and activities of natural 
objects. Before I present this argument, it is impor-
tant to examine Aristotle's claim that the Unmoved 
Mover is a good. 
(3) The argument that the Unmoved Mover is a good is extremely condensed: 
. . . and insofar as it [the first mover J exists 
by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it 
is in this sense a first principle. (1072bl0-
At first glance, it appears that the goodness of the 
Unmoved Mover derives from its necessity"and that the 
Unmoved Mover is a first principle by virtue of the 
fact that its 'mode of being' is good. 
Our earlier concern was to understand in what sense 
the Unmoved Mover was an object of desire. If an ob-
ject of desire is either a good or an apparent good, 
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then the sense in which the Unmoved Mover is an object 
of desire depends on the sense in which it is good. 
Aristotle's argument quoted immediately above is 
surely a nexus of central and fundamental themes in 
Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. I cannot hope to 
treat all of them in adequate detail here, but I will 
try to cite those important details which will illumi-
nate the link between the Unmoved Mover and its being a 
good. 
First, I interpret the puzzling discussion about 
the "column of opposites" (1072a30-35), following 
Apostle, in this way[7]: 'good' has as many senses as 
•being'. 'Good', like 'being', can be predicated of 
all the categories. There is no sense of 'good' apart 
from its being predicated of any .of the categories, 
i.e., there is no good-in-itself which has being apart 
from a good action, a good house, a good argument 
(Nichomachean Ethics I, 6 1096al9-29). Therefore, the 
Unmoved Mover cannot be said to be a good in the sense 
of the good-in-itself. 
A thing is most good when it is chosen for its own 
sake (NE 1097al5-23). A lesser good is one chosen for 
the sake of something else. Now a thing chosen could 
be said (with qualification) to be an object of desire; 
therefore a good—a thing chosen for its own sake—is 
an object of desire. And insofar as a thing chosen for 
its own sake is said to be better than a thing chosen 
for the sake of something else, it follows that an ob-
ject of desire chosen for its own sake is most good, or 
as Aristotle puts it, "the first in any class is always 
best, or analogous to the best" (1072a36). First in 
the class of goods, then, are those chosen for their 
own sake. 
The argument proceeds similarly, I think, for 
being. The first in the class of being is that which 
exists as it is and could not not exist other than it 
is, i.e., the primary sense of being is that which ex-
ists necessarily. It follows, as we have seen, that 
any such necessarily existent being must be eternal, 
simple, and entirely actual as well. 
What emerges from this analysis is that the Unmoved 
Mover is pre-eminent among substances in that its es-
sential attributes are supreme or superlative 
attributes—most truly existent and most truly good. 
If so, then the link between its necessity and its 
goodness is an essential link which I think fair to 
call extensional equivalence. Insofar as a thing ex-
ists necessarily it also must be entirely good. Such a 
thing, therefore, must be an object of desire because 
anything which is entirely good, if chosen, is chosen 
for its own sake. 
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Second, there is another sense of 'good' relevant 
to the being of the Unmoved Mover. Not only is the 
Unmoved Mover said to be a good and hence chosen for 
its own sake, it is also an obiect of love (eromenon, 
beloved, 1072b4): 
The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved. (1072b4) 
I think it reasonable to interpret this passage in this 
way: as a final cause, the Unmoved Mover is more than 
an object of desire—it is an object of love; but 
generally, because all final causes need not be objects 
of love. What is the relevant difference between these 
two notions? 
Aquinas characterizes it in this way, in his com-
mentary on the Metaphysics: 
And it is better to speak of it [the Unmoved 
Mover] as something loved rather than as someth-
ing desired, since there is desire only of 
something that is not yet possessed, but there is 
love even of something that is possessed.[8] 
The point here, I take it, is that we only properly 
desire that which we do not possess or that which we 
have not yet achieved. If we have possessed or 
achieved it, we would no longer desire it. But even if 
we possessed or achieved our object of desire, we could 
still love, admire, greatly value our possession or 
achievement and continue to act for its sake. In the 
context of the Unmoved Mover, it is odd to speak of the 
first heaven, for example desiring to 'possess' the 
Unmoved Mover; likewise it is odd to say that natural 
objects desire to possess it. But it is at least not 
odd in the same way to say that the heavens and terres-
trial beings move and act as they do for the sake of 
achieving the 'good' which the Unmoved Mover qua object 
of love is properly said to be. 
We can go somewhat further than Aquinas. Granted 
that the Unmoved Mover is not an object of desire in 
the sense that creatures desire to possess it, never-
theless desire is important in understanding the causal 
relation between the Unmoved Mover and the heavens and 
natural objects. We do not desire to possess the 
Unmoved Mover, but we do desire to bring about, in 
particular activities, the good—pure actuality—which 
the Unmoved Mover formally captures in its being. 
One last point on the relevant sense of 'good'. 
An oversimplified but basically sound judgment about 
Aristotle's commitment to the teleological character of 
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natural activity is this: what natural objects do of 
their own nature is the best for objects of that kind. 
The essence of a substance must capture 'what it is to 
be' a thing of this kind. The essence of a substance, 
hence, is intrinsically normative in that it discloses 
the essential attributes, so to speak, which a thing 
must actualize if it is to be a good thing of its kind. 
Thus, the motions of the heavens and the activities of 
terrestrial creatures, when these arise out of their 
natures, are for the best. The specific content of 
what is best, of course, differs from species to 
species. But the very notion of what it is to be best 
is the essence of the Unmoved Mover. The Unmoved Mover 
is that substance whose reality, eternality and good-
ness just is what is it to be best. And I venture this 
interpretation that, for Aristotle, what it is to be 
best is to be as actualized, completed, perfected as 
possible. All natural objects have matter of some kind 
and hence cannot be perfectly actualized. Unactualized 
potentiality will always remain in any natural object 
due to that matter. But, formally, what it is to be a 
good rock, or a good oak tree, or a good human being is 
to be as actualized as possible, in the way appropriate 
to the species. 
The Unmoved Mover is essentially a perfectly ac-
tualized substance, and hence, is that most real and 
most good being which we desire to become like insofar 
as we strive in our nature to be as completely actual 
as possible. We strive, within the bounds of our 
natures, to achieve in activity that good which com-
pletes or perfects us. But actualization of our poten-
tial requires effort, and since our essence is not that 
of actuality, our potential may not be actualized. The 
essence of the Unmoved Mover, however, is pure 
actuality. The Unmoved Mover is the final cause of 
those activities by which we actualize our being, 
because it is that eternal ideal of perfection which 
inspires us to persist in those activities which con-
tribute to our actualization. The Unmoved Mover is 
that being which exists in the way each natural object 
strives to exist—actualized. The Unmoved Mover is a 
final cause as we have seen, in the sense that it is 
the actuality 'at which action aims'. 
If this analysis is sound, it reveals at least in 
broad outline how the Unmoved Mover stands in the rela-
tion of final cause to not only the first heaven, but 
to all the other spheres and to terrestrial natural ob-
jects as well.[9J 
It has been my intention in this paper to develop 
the notion of the Unmoved Mover and to analyse 
Aristotle's arguments in an entirely non-theological 
context. To do so is appropriate, since in none of the 
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texts examined here has Aristotle used the term for 
God, theos. An examination of the connection between 
the attributes and characteristics of the Unmoved Mover 
explored here and the concept of a theological God in 
Aristotle (if there is one) comprises another fruitful 
inquiry in itself. I close by suggesting that the 
analysis herein might contribute to such an inquiry in 
this way: If I am right about the relation of final 
causality holding between the Unmoved Mover and all 
natural motion and activity, then a traditional 
criticism of Aristotle's 'theology*—viz., that 
Aristotle's 'God' is remote from and plays no role in 
the world of human activity—can be seen to be without 
foundation.[10] 
170 
NOTES 
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from 
Aristotle's works are taken from Richard McKeon, 
Editor, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: 
Random House, 1941.) 
*There is, of course, a long tradition of litera-
ture debating the question of whether the modal predi-
cates can properly be predicates of 'things'. I do not 
try to make any case one way or the other here for 
Aristotle's view, except to say that his language when 
construed literally seems to indicate that some beings 
exist necessarily—i.e., not dependent on any other. I 
discuss the topic further in Section II of this paper. 
2 . Locomotion (motion in place) is more perfect than any of the other types of motion (viz., alteration, in-crease and decrease) because the substance undergoing locomotion does not become different from itself, merely different in place. Locomotion in a circle is more perfect than linear locomotion (vertical or horizontal) because it is continuous. Cf. Physics VIII, 7-9; also De Caelo 1,2 268bl5-169bl8. See also, Leo V. Elders, Aristotle's Theology: A Commentary on Book X of the Metaphysics (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), pp. 141-42. 
3 
See W. K. C. Guthrie, "The Development of 
Aristotle's Theology," Classical Quarterly XXVII 
(1933), pp. 162-71. In brief, Guthrie argues that 
there is textual evidence that Chapter 8 is a later 
treatise, written from personal study with Callipus 
well after the initial broader conception of the 
Unmoved Mover (in Chapters 6 and 7) was formulated. In 
my view, the arguments in Chapter 8 do not affect the 
interpretation of the Unmoved Mover which I offer here. 
See also, Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: The Fundamentals 
of his Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 
pp. 345-67, for his discussion of Aristotle's later 
views on the 'Prime Mover'. 
4 . 
Hicks translates this passage as follows: 
Hence it is invariably the object of appetency 
which causes motion, but this object may be 
either the good or the apparent good. Not all 
good, however, but practical good: where by 
practical good we mean something which may not 
be good under all circumstances. 
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R. D. Hicks, Aristotle: De Anitna (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1965), p. 151. 
5 
See J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Distinction 
Between Energeia and Kinesis," in Renford Bambrough. 
Editor. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 121-42. 
6An additional argument for the simplicity and in-
divisibility of the Unmoved Mover is found in Met. XII, 
7 1073al-12 and in Physics VIII, 10. 
7 
H. G. Apostle, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 402; see also Elders, pp. cit., pp. 168-69 for a brief discussion of the 'table of opposites*. 
St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Volume II, John P. Rowan, translator (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), p. 889. 
9 
I recognize that in order to defend this view much 
more work needs to be done; but best done, I think, In 
future work. For instance, Aristotle's comments about 
the thinking of the Unmoved Mover and the object of its 
thought in 1072bl4-30 is directly relevant to the sense 
in which the Unmoved Mover is the final cause of human 
activity. Further, the notions of 'activity' and 
'excellence' must be explored, and a detailed inquiry 
into the question of whether the acquisition and exer-
cise of human excellences—both moral and 
intellectual—arise out of our nature and in that sense 
are properly said to be natural activities. If they 
are natural activities, then perhaps my analysis can 
fill an apparent gap in the foundation of Aristotle's 
ethics: viz., that the moral 'motivation' for ac-
quiring the excellences rests in our desire for 
actualization; in our striving, not for the being of 
the Unmoved Mover, but for the mode of his being— 
perfect, complete, actualized. In his History of Greek Philosophy, Fuller indi-cates a somewhat similar view in the following passage: 
Aristotle had now a form of being, the example of 
whose perfect actuality was sufficient to set ev-
ery degree of potentiality in the universe going, 
from the operations of the human mind and the 
stately 'whence and whither' of the outer heaven 
to the crude capacities of prime matter. Such a 
being was a combination of metaphysical catalyzer 
and magnet. Its mere presence set up a commotion 
in which it took no part and by which it was 
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unaffected, but a commotion, nevertheless, that 
converged from every side unerringly towards 
itself. B. A. G. Fuller, History of Greek 
Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt, 1931), p. 153. 
1 0See Fuller, ibid., pp. 146-53. For example: 
The most serious and disqualifying charge is that, 
if the Unmoved Mover is so shut away from the 
universe as to be totally unaware of its existence, 
it is difficult to see how the universe can be in 
any way aware of God, not to speak of; being 
thrilled and moved by the appeal of his perfection, 
(p. 146) On religious grounds, also, Aristotle's 
theology has been severely taken to task. We must 
admit that his God is, to say the least, an austere 
object of worship. Regarded merely as an ideal and 
as a beloved whom one is content to adore at a 
distance, such a being can with difficulty be 
conceived as moving the world's heart or even its 
head. (p. 147) 
The objection from religious grounds perhaps is summed up in this way: 
The religious value of any God will lie, then, 
largely in the reciprocal interest he shows in us, 
our affairs, and our needs. He must be not only an 
unmoved mover untouched by imperfections, but a 
moved mover as well, stirred by compassion for the 
weakness and the misery of the finite creature, and 
bestirring himself actively on our behalf, (p. 
148) 
Further objections along these lines can be found 
in T. M. Forsyth, "Aristotle's Concept of God as Final 
Cause," Philosophy XXII (1947), pp. 112-23, and George 
A. Lindbeck, "A Note on Aristotle's Discussion of God 
and World," Review of Metaphysics I (1948), pp. 99-106. 
Both of these authors are highly critical of the 
theological adequacy of Aristotle's concept of God. 
Such criticisms seem, however, narrow and off the 
point. It is not entirely clear that one is obliged, 
on the basis of anything Aristotle says, to confer 
theological, 'belief-inducing,' or 'worship-worthy' at-
tributes to the Unmoved Mover. 
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